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Consider a strategic form, two-person game G with finite strategy spaces X I ,  X2. A 
fictitious play sequence is an infinite sequence x(t) E X = X i  x X2 such that, for i = 1, 2 
and every t 2 1, xi(t + 1) is a best response by i to the empirical frequency distribution 
ft(x-i) of the actions x-i taken by the other side up through time t. (We assume x(1) is 
arbitrary.) G has thefictitious play property if every limit point of the sequence {P(xl), 
ft(x2)) is a Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed) of G. Fictitious play was originally 
proposed as an algorithm for computing equilibria in games (Brown, 1951), and indeed it 
does have this property for zero-sum games (Robinson, 195 1) and 2 x 2 games (Myasawa, 
1961). However, a well-known 3 x 3 example due to Shapley (1964) shows that games 
in general do not have the fictitious play property. 
Recently there has been a revival of interest in fictitious play and related processes that 
model how players learn to play a game. (See among others Foster and Young, 1990; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 199 1 ; Crawford, 199 1 ; Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993; Kandori, 
Mailath and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993; Kaniovski and Young, 1994; Blume, 1995). 
Hence it is of interest to know whether fictitious play converges for substantial classes of 
games, if not for all possible games. Among the classes for which convergence has been 
established are dominance-solvable games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991), two-person 
games with strategic complementarities and diminishing returns (Krishna, 1991), and 
games with identical interests, that is, games that are best-reply equivalent in mixed 
strategies to a game in which all players have identical payoff functions (Monderer and 
Shapley, 1993a). 
Many of the games for which fictitious play has been shown to converge have an acyclic 
best-reply structure. To make this idea precise, let us associate with each strategy profile 
x E X a node of a graph. Draw a directed edge from node x to node x' if and only if for 
some player i, x'i z xi, x'i is a best reply to x-i, and x-i = x'-i. This is called the best-reply 
graph of G .  The game G is acylic if it contains no directed cycles. It is weakly acyclic if 
from every node there exists a directed path to a strict Nash equilibrium, that is, to a node 
that has no exiting edge (Young, 1993).1 Every game with identical interests in which no 
two strategy profiles yield the same payoff for both players is acyclic. (Every directed 
path in the best-reply graph strictly increases the payoff of both players, so it cannot cycle.) 
A particularly natural class of games with an acyclic structure are the coordination games. 
By a coordination game we mean a two-person, n x n matrix game such that every strategy 
pair of form (xj, xj) is a strict Nash equilibrium,l I j I n. In the best-reply graph of this 
game, every edge is directed toward a coordination equilibrium and no edge is directed 
away from such an equilibrium. Hence there can be no best-reply cycles. 
We now exhibit a coordination game that does not have the fictitious play property. 
lThere are several variations of this definition. For example, we could draw a directed edge from x to x' if 
and only if some player i strictly prefers x'i to xi given the strategy tuple x-i, and x'-i = x-i. (Thus x'i need 
not be a best reply to x-i.) The game G is said to have thefinite improvement property if this graph has 
no directed cycles (Monderer and Shapley, 1993b). If G has the finite improvement property and there are 
no ties in payoffs, then G is acyclic, but the converse does not necessarily hold. Another variant is the 
following: draw an edge from x to x' if x'i is a strict best reply to x-i, x'i f xi, and x-i' = x-i. This is a 
less stringent version of acyclicity. See Monderer and Sela (1994) for a discussion of these ideas and their 
connections with fictitious play. 
Consider a fictitious play sequence in which Row chooses D' and Column chooses D" in 
the first period. In the next period the best replies are D" for Row and D' for Column, and 
the process unfolds as shown below: 
t = l  2 3 4 5 6 . . .  17 18 1 9 2 0  . . .  91 9 2 9 3  
Row Dl D" A' A" Bl B" . . . B' B" C'  C" . . . C' C" A' . . . 
Column D" Do A" A' B" B ' .  . . B" B' C" C' . .  . C" C' A" . . . 
The role of D' and D" is to break ties asymmetrically; after the first two rounds they are 
never chosen again. Given these initial two choices, Row has a slight preference for ' 
strategies over " strategies within each category (A, B, C), whereas Column prefers the 
reverse. This leads the players to coordinate within the same category of strategy, but they 
never actually coordinate. Instead, the process cycles between regimes in which an 
alternating series of mismatched pairs of A are played, followed by an alternating series of 
mismatched pairs of B, then of C, then back to A, and so forth. Call each of these 
alternating series a run. Let rk be the number of periods in run k. The first three runs are 
of length rl = 2, r2 = 14, and r3 = 74. In general we have the following recursion 
From this it follows that each run is about five times as long as the previous one. Hence 
the empirical frequency distribution of strategies never converges, so a fortiori it does not 
converge to an equilibrium. 
To prove (1) we proceed by induction on k. For k = 0 the result follows by plugging in 
the values rl = 2, r2 = 14, and r3 = 74. Suppose now that k > 0. Since the game is 
symmetric in A, B, C, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the (k + 3)rd run is an 
A-series, that is, k = 1 (mod 3). Thus the (k + 2)nd run is a C-series, and the (k + 1)st 
run is a B-series. To  find which strategy is a best response by Row at any given time t, it 
suffices to compute the hypothetical total payoff (to Row) of each strategy assuming it were 
played against all previous choices by Column up through time t - 1. Call this the score of 
the strategy at time t. Fictitious play stipulates that in each period Row choose a strategy 
with highest score. 
Consider the (k + 3)rd run of A's. Each time that Column plays A'A" in succession, both 
A-strategies for Row increase their score by 24 + 6 = 30, both B-strategies increase their 
score by 18 + 18 = 36, and both C-strategies increase their score by zero. In particular B' 
gains 6 points relative to A' in every two periods of the current run. Let S A ~  and SB- be the 
scores of A' and B' at the beginning of the run. Let [x] denote the least integer greater 
than or equal to x. Then it takes rk+3 =  SAD - S B @ ) / ~ ]  periods for B' to overtake A' (i.e., 
for B' to become a better reply than A' by Row), which ends this run and starts the next 
one. 
It remains to compute the difference SK - SB*. Consider the first period of the (k + 1)st 
run. At this point, B' has just overtaken A'. Moreover if their scores are S * A ~  and S*B~,  
then we have 0 < S * B ~  - S*A' < 6. (This is because they start period 3 with a difference 
that is less than 6, and all subsequent actions change the scores by multiples of 6.) 
During the ensuing B-series, which lasts for rk+l periods, A' increases its score by 0, B' 
increases its score by 30(rk+1)/2, and C' increases its score by 36(rk+1)/2. After this the 
C-series commences. This run increases the score of A' by 36(rk+2)/2, the score of B' by 
0, and the score of C' by 30(rk+2)/2. Thus we have 
SA* = 36(~+2) /2  + S*A' and S B ~  = 30 (rk+1)/2 + S*B' . (2) 
We may assume by induction that &+I and rk+2 are even. From (2) it follows that 
We also know that -5 I (S*A~ - S*B~) I -1. Hence 
and therefore 
Hence rk+3 is even and formula (1) holds for k, from which it follows by induction that (1) 
holds for all k. 
We can think of this game as modelling a squabble among competing doctrines. Imagine 
two groups of academics (or politicians or religious leaders) who periodically announce a 
position on some issue. There are three types of positions -- A, B, C -- and each position 
has two specific variants. It is in the interest of both groups to coordinate on the same 
position and the same variant of that position. The difficulty is that their preferences differ 
when they become involved in a doctrinal squabble. By a "squabble" we mean 
prevarication between two variants of the same policy, say a fifty-fifty probability mixture 
between A' and A". Once a squabble starts the parties keep shifting position. Both Row 
and Column prefer either version of B to an A-squabble. The trouble is that their most 
preferred versions of B differ (because of the initial choice of D-strategies), which leads to 
a B-squabble. Compared to a B-squabble they would rather choose either version of C, 
but again they cannot agree on which version of C. Thus one squabble begets another. 
Does this counterexample show that agents cannot learn to play coordination equilibria over 
time? We think not. The reason is that such examples are knife-edge in construction. If 
there are small stochastic variations and past actions are eventually forgotten (which we 
think are characteristic of most learning processes), then the process exhibits much better 
long-run behavior. 
To be concrete, suppose that for some large integer m we truncate each fictitious play 
sequence x(t) to the most recent m periods. Thus actions more than m periods old are 
forgotten, and the state at the beginning of time t is a sequence h(t) of form (x(t - m), 
x(t - m + l), . . ., x(t - 1)) if t > m, and of form (x(l), x(2), . . . , x(t - 1)) if 1 < t I m. 
(The process begins at t = 1 with the empty sequence.) Suppose further that the players 
only have incomplete information about what the others have done in the past. In each 
period t > 1, each agent chosen to play draws a random sample of size k without 
replacement from the sequence h(t). (If h(t) is of length less than k, all entries are 
sampled.) The draws are independent for the two agents. Each agent then chooses a best 
reply to the empirical frequency distribution (in his sample) of what the other side has 
done. It is easy to see that every state in which the same coordination equilibrium is 
played m times in succession is absorbing. Moreover these are the only absorbing states. 
It can be shown that, if Wm is sufficiently small ( in particular if Wm I 1/2), the process 
converges with probability one to an absorbing state. In other words, a coordination 
equilibrium will eventually be played with probability one (Young, 1993, Theorem 1). the 
reason this works is that the stochastic variability created by incomplete sampling 
eventually jostles the process out of uncoordinated cycles. Once the process hits an 
absorbing state, however, the sampling variability vanishes and the process stays there 
forever. 
Similar results obtain under other kinds of stochastic perturbation. Suppose, for example, 
that there is some systematic "error" in the players' responses. Let 8 be a small positive 
number. Suppose that with probability 1 - 8 a given agent chooses a best reply to the 
frequency distribution of the other side's actions in a random sample drawn from h(t), but 
with probability 8 she chooses a strategy at random. The probabilities of these events are 
independent for the two agents. We then obtain a Markov process ~6 on the finite state 
space H consisting of all sequences from X of length at most m. The process is ergodic 
because there is a positive probability of moving from any state to any other in m periods or 
less. It can be shown that, for all sufficiently small 6 ,  the players play a coordination 
equilibrium with near certainty over the long run. More precisely, given the process p6 let 
xj' be the long-run probability that the jth coordination equilibrium (xj, xj) is played in any 
given period t as t + -. This probability exists because the process is aperiodic and 
ergodic. It can be shown that, given any E > 0, zj=l,n xj6 b 1 - E for all sufficiently small 
6 (Young, 1993). In other words, the probability is at least 1 - E that over the long run the 
players coordinate at any given time. Indeed, it can be shown that in the absence of ties 
(i.e., in a generic coordination game) the players coordinate almost all of the time on 
exactly one of the coordination equilibria when the noise 6 is small.2 
An analogous result holds for weakly acyclic games. Let G be weakly acyclic and let N be 
the set of all strict Nash equilibria in pure strategies for G. If follows from weak acyclicity 
that N is nonempty. Let &(x) be the long-run probability that the strategy profile x is 
played at any given time t as t + -. Then, for every E > 0, C x E ~  sc6(x) 2 1 - E for all 
sufficiently small 6. (This follows from the proof of Theorem 4 in Young, 1993). In 
other words, over the long run a strict Nash equilibrium will be played with high 
probability when the noise 6 is sufficiently small. 
In sum, variations of fictitious play that incorporate random perturbations and finite 
memory have better convergence properties than fictitious play itself for a fairly large class 
of games that includes coordination games and generic identical interest games. 
2 ~ e e  also Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) for similar results. 
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